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Excerpt

Context

IAM

Title

Privileged Access Classification

Contributors

Contributors
modelist
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Version

1.2

Status
colourYellow
titleDraft

Summary

The objective of this article is to document existing privileged access taxonomies and typologies and possibly to develop a new one that is operationally adequate to support the PAM processes of organizations.

See Also

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For an introduction to classification, please refer to An introduction to classifications, taxonomies and typologies.

Classification Objectives

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Existing Classifications

  •  Include literature review on privileged and technical access definitions.

Source

Dimensions

Classes

KPMG, 2018

  • Risk

  • # of users

  • Privileged (Managed by PAM Solution)

    • Domain Admins

    • Database, Infrastructure, Platform Admins

    • Application Admins

  • Powerful (Managed by IAG Solution)

    • Application Super Users, Database Users, Platform Remote Access Users

  • Regular (Managed by IAG Solution)

    • Standard Application Users

...

What is it that we are trying to classify?

  •  Provide here a clear definition of privileged access in the context of this particular note.
  •  Include def of pseudo-identities, partial identities and secrets

Dimensions

By definition, a classification must be based on observable properties of population being studied.

  •  List candidate dimensions
  •  Mention the extent to which dimension categories are mutually exclusive
  • Entities using the access (e.g.: Gartner taxonomy)

    • by people

    • by software

      • by dedicated person or shared among multiple persons

  • Entities using the access (2)

    • by technical people

    • by business people

  • Genesis

    • by system (e.g. “native” accounts)

    • by people (“users” created by admins)

  • Scope of privilege

    • Single system

    • Limited set of systems (e.g. cluster admins)

    • Pervasive in the IS (e.g. domain admins)

  • Operational constraints

    • Can be deactivated or not

    • Can be renamed or not

    • Can be…

  • Level of operational risks

    • This is organization specific

  • Software stack level

    • OS

    • Middleware

    • Application

    • Others (e.g. hypervisor)

  • IAM superpowers including impersonation

    • None

    • May impersonate some other identities

    • May create other identities

    • May modify other identities, including granting and revoking accesses

...

User Access Management versus Secret Management

  •  Propose candidate classifications

Bibliography

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Jira Legacy
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